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This study traces the interactions between economic growth, income inequality and
consumption poverty in a sample of African countries during the 1990s. It draws on the
much-improved household data sets now available in the region. It finds that
experiences have varied: some countries have seen sharp falls in income poverty; others
have witnessed marked increases. Economic growth has been ‘pro-poor’ in that the
incomes of poor households have typically grown at similar or faster rates than average
income. But the aggregate numbers hide significant and systematic distributional effects
which have caused some groups and regions to be left behind. The paper explores the
contours of these effects, and draws three key conclusions. First, agricultural market
liberalization has been conducive to reductions in rural poverty. Second, market
connectedness is crucial for poor producers to take advantage of the opportunities
offered by economic growth. Some regions and households by virtue of their sheer…/…
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remoteness have been left behind when growth picks up. The availability of
infrastructure (especially roads) and proximity to markets are crucial. And finally risks,
such as rainfall variations and ill health are found to have profound effects on poverty
outcomes, underscoring the significance of social protection in poverty reduction
strategies in Africa.
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1 Introduction
Debates about the relationship between economic growth, income inequality and poverty
have a particular resonance in Africa. While the persistence of deep-seated poverty is
undoubtedly a result of its slow economic progress over the past two decades, there
remains a difference of opinion about whether growth benefits the poorest segments of
African societies. The Dollar and Kraay (2000) view that growth is good for the poor has
been disputed largely in the African context (see Forsyth 2000). Resolving these
differences is made complex by the many changes that have affected people’s lives and
livelihoods during the 1990s. Reforms, shifts in external opportunities, and sharp
movements in the terms of trade have all changed the economic environment. Some
countries faced internal civil strife and political instability. Others had to endure severe
drought. And there have been serious health shocks, such as AIDS and malaria, affecting
rich and poor alike. This complexity makes for considerable debate about the impact of
economic growth on the lives of poor Africans.
In their review of the cross-country growth literature, Collier and Gunning (1999) conclude
that the slow economic progress in Africa is due to three sets of factors: geography (the
land-locked, tropical character of many countries); macroeconomic policies (notably
economic policy volatility and a lack of openness to international trade); and
microeconomic policies, which have disproportionately taxed rural producers, eroded
social capital, undermined the provision of public services, and resulted in a retreat into
subsistence by rural producers. Despite these important insights from cross country
analysis, the reasons for ‘Africa’s growth and poverty paradox’ (Easterly and Levine 1997)
remain open to debate. The limited number of countries, and the high correlation between
the explanatory variables, means that the findings are often highly sensitive to the
specification of the estimation model. The use of countrywide averages in this literature
also limits what can be said about the distributional dimension of growth. It is unlikely,
therefore, that cross-country analysis alone will resolve the growth-poverty issue (Brock
and Durlauf 2000; Bourguignon 2000; Deininger and Okidi 2001). A more microeconomic
approach is called for (Collier and Gunning 1999; Ravallion 2001). Only then can research
establish ‘why some poor people are able to take up the opportunities afforded by an
expanding economy—and so add to its expansion—while others are not’ (Ravallion
2001:1813). This study adopts this micro perspective, and focuses on three key factors
which govern how different groups in African society have been affected by recent
economic growth (and also episodes of economic recession)—reforms, remoteness and
risk.
The main point of departure in the growth-poverty debate in the African context has been
the assessment of how economic policy reforms have affected income distribution and
poverty. This debate refuses to go away, in part because it was not well served by good
data (both macro and micro). Expressing an ‘African perspective’, Mkandawire and
Soludo (1999:73) conclude that structural adjustment programmes did not place African
economies on a ‘poverty-reducing growth path’. And Stewart (1995:155) draws a similar2
conclusion, albeit based on very flimsy data. On the other hand, the application of
quantitative general equilibrium models suggested that policy reforms had mildly
favourable effects (Sahn 1994, 1996; Sahn et al. 1997). Given the lags involved, the 1990s
might be a more appropriate decade to examine the growth path induced by economic
policy reforms in Africa (Collier and Gunning 1999). With more comprehensive and
comparable household data (including emerging panel data), and with another decade of
economic reform in many countries, it is now essential to revisit this issue.
Our second major theme is remoteness—the fact that many poor Africans live out their
lives with little access to public services and markets. Only micro data can help unravel its
effect on persistent poverty.1 Regions and households within these regions, may evolve
differently due to spatial externalities related for example to knowledge diffusion and
agglomeration effects (Ravallion 2002). The marginal cost of adopting new technologies or
expanding into new activities (for example, off-farm employment) typically declines as the
necessary infrastructure becomes more widely available and more people in the network
become accustomed to the new technologies. A household’s spatial position also affects its
access to both input and output markets—coined ‘cost’ and ‘demand linkages’ by Davis
and Weinstein (2003)—necessary for accumulating wealth and benefiting from the
opportunities an overall economic upturn provides. Regional differences in living
standards are obviously also linked to the agro-ecological characteristics of the
environment (temperature, rainfall, altitude, slope, soil fertility, etc.) which affect the
productive potential of the locality and its inhabitants. And the availability of public
infrastructure and services (electricity, sanitation, health and schooling facilities, credit and
extension services) often differs considerably across regions. There is a strong expectation,
therefore, that growth in Africa is likely to have highly differentiated geographical effects.
The third factor which governs how poor people have been affected by economic growth in
Africa is risk. Among the factors explaining poverty at the household level ‘disease and
climate feature most prominently, and these are largely omitted in the aggregate analysis’
(Collier and Gunning 1999:83). These growth-retarding risks might explain the ‘Africa
dummy’ in growth regressions.2 It is widely documented that households in Africa live and
work in risky environments with insufficient access to credit or insurance to protect their
consumption from shocks (Besley 1995; Morduch 1995). In the absence of such
mechanisms they often engage in low-risk, low-return activities, which lock them into
perpetual poverty. In the review that follows we focus on two main risk factors that have
dominated Africa during the 1990s, disease and drought.
                                                
1 While the importance of location has received somewhat less attention in the developing economics
literature, the point is obviously not new. Quah (1996) even argues that in understanding regional
convergence (or lack thereof) in Europe physical location and geographical spillovers matter more than,
national macro factors.
2 In support of this hypothesis Guillaumont et al. (1999) find that economic, political and natural volatility
are important factors in explaining the poor growth performance of African economies.3
The study elabourates on the results of a series of poverty dynamics country studies3 which
exploit household survey data in Africa covering the 1990s. When available, household
panel data have been used (Ethiopia and Uganda), though important insights were also
obtained from repeated cross sections (Zimbabwe, Ghana, and Madagascar). It begins with
a review in Section 2 of the trends in living standards during the 1990s, describing the
evolution of income inequality and poverty and their relation with economic growth.
Section 3 goes beyond the averages and identifies the main factors behind the observed
trends—reforms, remoteness and risk. Concluding observations are made in the final
section.
2 Living standards during the 1990s
Table 1 describes the evolution of private consumption, primary school enrollment, child
malnutrition, and child mortality in our selection of countries during the 1990s. The first
and obvious point is that living standards are still very low in these countries. By the close
of the decade, no country enjoyed an annual per capita consumption in excess of US$500,
and in Ethiopia it was just US$86. All countries fell far short of universal primary
enrollment, and in some (for example, Ethiopia) primary enrollments were unacceptably
low. Malnutrition was a very serious problem, especially in Madagascar and Ethiopia,
where more than half the children exhibited signs of stunting or long-term malnutrition.
Even in Ghana, Mauritania and Zimbabwe, there is evidence of stunting in about a quarter
of the population under five years of age. Perhaps the most poignant indicator of the very
low welfare levels is the incidence of child deaths. Under-five mortality exceeded 100 (per
1,000) in all countries. In Zambia, almost one in five children failed to survive to their fifth
birthday. Too many African children are dying needlessly.
Second, there are differences in the changes in these indicators over time. In four countries
economic living standards appear to have improved. But in Madagascar, average real
consumption remained more or less unchanged, while it fell sharply in Nigeria, Zambia
and Zimbabwe. Similarly, improvements in primary school enrollment in Ethiopia, Ghana,
Mauritania and Uganda contrast with unsatisfactory outcomes in Zambia. Ethiopia and
Mauritania experienced sharp reductions in long-term malnutrition, but there was little
progress elsewhere. In all countries the long-term downward trend in child mortality
appears to have continued through the decade, except in Zimbabwe, a result probably
related to the AIDS epidemic (among other factors), and in Nigeria. Also the 2000/01
round of the Uganda Demographic and Health Survey suggests that child mortality in
Uganda has been unchanged (and possibly even increased) since 1997 (UDHS 2001),
despite economic gains.
                                                
3 The selection of countries was based on the availability of comparable measures of consumption, and
includes Ethiopia, Ghana, Madagascar, Mauritania, Nigeria, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. These are
reported in Bigsten et al. (2003) and Dercon (2000, 2002); Coulombe and McKay (2001); Paternostro et al.
(2001); McCulloch et al. (2000); Canagarajah et al. (2000); Appleton (2001); Appleton et al. (1999);
Deininger and Okidi (2001); McCulloch et al. (2001); Alwang and Ersado (1999); and Alwang et al. (2002).4




















































































































































































Ethiopia 1994-97 80 86 2.6 19 25 +6 66 55 -11 190 175 -15
Ghana 1992-98 275 304 2.0 70 82 +12 26 26 0 119 104 -15
Mauritania 1987-95 297 361 3.6 28 41 +13 48 23 -25 - 149 -
Uganda 1992-97 211 258 4.7 68 86 +18 43 39 -4 165 162 -3
Stagnation/decline:
Madagascar 1993-99 223 222 0.0 48 64 +16 50 49 -1 170 149 -21
Nigeria 1992-96 206 173 -3.4 94 98 +4 38 - - 136 147 11
Zambia 1991-98 362 266 -6.6 73 66 -7 40 42 +2 192 202 10
Zimbabwe 1991-96 595 439 -5.2 83 86 +3 30 23 -7 80 90 10
Notes
: 1Growth rates calculated based on least squared method, which is less sensitive to the choice of base
and terminal period. 2Net enrollment rates = percentage of children of school age enrolled in primary school
as a fraction of the total number of children in that age group. Figures obtained from the surveys analyzed in
the Poverty Dynamics studies. First year figure for Ethiopia refers to 1996. Figures for Nigeria reflect gross
enrollment rates in 1994 and 1996 and are obtained from World Development Indicators. 3Child malnutrition
defined as the percentage of children stunted, i.e. z-score of height for age which is less than -2; the reference
periods for these figures approximate to those in column 1. 4Child mortality under 5 (per 1,000 live births); the
reference periods approximate to those in column 1.
Sources: World Bank data and country studies under the Poverty Dynamics study (see footnote 3 and
references).
Third, the trends in the indicators are generally consistent with each other, though there are
some important exceptions. In the four countries experiencing economic growth (Ethiopia,
Ghana, Mauritania, and Uganda) the trends in human development indicators match the
improvement in economic well-being, albeit to different degrees. But in those experiencing
stagnation and decline, the signals are noisier. In some cases the education indicator
improved despite the stagnation or decline in economic living standards (Madagascar,
Nigeria and Zimbabwe). Child mortality improved in Zambia and child malnutrition
improved in Zimbabwe during episodes of deteriorating economic circumstance. Such
outcomes (and the experience of Uganda after 1995) serve as a reminder that focusing only
on one dimension of well-being can be misleading when tracking poverty dynamics over
time (World Bank 2000).
2.1 Income inequality4
We turn now to the distributional aspects of economic well-being, and to the issue of
whether episodes of growth in the 1990s in Africa were associated with changes in income
                                                
4 As all our empirical measures of income are based on expenditures, we use the terms ‘income’ and
‘consumption’ interchangeably in the remainder of the text.5
Table 2: Consumption inequality
1 during the 1990s in eight African countries
Gini coefficient Year 1 Year 2 Change
Ethiopia
2











Rural 0.33 0.33 0.00
Urban 0.34 0.31 -0.03
All 0.37 0.37 -0.00
Madagascar 1993–99
Rural 0.42 0.36 -0.06
Urban 0.41 0.38 -0.03
All 0.43 0.38 -0.05
Mauritania 1987-95
Rural 0.43 0.37 -0.06
Urban 0.40 0.36 -0.04
All 0.43 0.39 -0.04
Nigeria 1992-96
Rural 0.51 0.44 -0.07
Urban 0.51 0.51 0.00
All 0.51 0.47 -0.04
Uganda 1992-2000
Rural 0.33 0.32 -0.01
Urban 0.39 0.40 0.01
All 0.36 0.38 0.02
Zambia 1991-98
Rural 0.61 0.48 -0.13
Urban 0.47 0.43 -0.04
All 0.58 0.48 -0.10
Zimbabwe 1991-96
Rural 0.58 0.57 -0.01
Urban 0.60 0.59 -0.01
All 0.68 0.64 -0.04
Note:  (1)Real expenditures per adult equivalent; real per capita expenditures for Ethiopia, Nigeria and
Madagascar. (2)Purposively sampled villages and urban centers; not nationally representative.
Source: Country studies under Dynamics of Poverty study (see footnote 3 and references).
inequality. Increasing reliance on markets and the withdrawal of the state might be
expected to increase income inequality (people with low levels of education, and limited
access to public services and markets being less likely to take advantage of the
opportunities growth presents). But on the other hand, given the previous tendency for the
state to tax agriculture and the rural sector heavily, the removal of such interventions might
result in improved national income distributions. We present Gini coefficients, a popular
measure of inequality, to describe how income inequality evolved in our sample of
countries (Table 2). All underlying ‘welfare measures’ are based on real total household6
expenditures.5 The surveys were designed to enable comparisons over time within a
country, though due to different survey designs caution is warranted in making
comparisons across countries. Nonetheless, the differences in the degree of income
inequality in our sample of countries are striking. At one extreme, Zimbabwe has a highly
unequal distribution (a Gini ratio of over 0.6),6 reflecting unequal land distribution, a result
in part of its colonial history. Income distributions in Ghana and Uganda are far more
egalitarian.
In terms of evolution, the picture is one of little change in overall income inequality in
these countries,7 except in Zambia. Reforms and growth have clearly not led to a
significant deterioration in consumption inequality, as popular belief would hold (Forsyth
2000)—though Ethiopia forms an exception. Nevertheless, these aggregate measures of
inequality can be misleading. They may in fact mask a great deal of distributional change,
an issue we review further in Section 3 below.
2.2 Trends in income poverty during the 1990s
If growth episodes were not associated with significant changes in inequality, did they lead
to poverty reduction? Table 3 reports poverty estimates for our countries. As with the
inequality measures, real household consumption per adult equivalent (or in some cases,
per capita) is taken as the central economic welfare measure. Poverty lines in all cases
(except Mauritania) are derived from a food consumption basket, estimated to yield a
minimum caloric intake, with adjustments made for essential non-food consumption. These
poverty lines are typically much higher than the purchasing power parity US$1/day
poverty line. The average poverty incidence in 24 spells of poverty change in African
countries analyzed by Ravallion (2001) was 31 per cent (based on the US$1/day line). This
compares with (unweighted) average headcounts of 55 per cent in our sample of twelve
spells, indicating higher poverty lines. Because of differences in survey design and in the
specifics of how the welfare measure and poverty lines are derived, the data in Table 3 are
not comparable across countries. But the research has been designed to ensure comparable
estimates over time.
The poverty measures we report here are derived from the familiar class of poverty indices
after Foster, Greer and Thorbecke (1984). In addition to the poverty headcount (P0),
Table  3 also includes the severity poverty index (P2) because it is sensitive to the
                                                
5 For most countries, expenditure is normalized on the number of ‘equivalent’ adults in the household. In
Ethiopia, Nigeria and Madagascar, the welfare measure is real household expenditure per capita.
6 Intuitively, the Gini index of a population represents the expected income difference between two randomly
selected individuals or households. From Table 1 we know that in Zimbabwe real average per capita
consumption in 1996 amounted to US$439. The corresponding Gini index is 0.64  (Table 2). Thus, in 1996
the per capita consumption of any two randomly selected Zimbabweans differed on average by US$281
(=0.64*US$439)—a clear indication of high inequality given that average per capita consumption is only
US$439.
7 A similar picture emerges when using the Theil inequality measures.7
distribution of income among the poor, and particularly to changes in the living standards
of the poorest of the poor. The data suggest the following:
•   Most countries can be considered as having to deal with ‘mass’ poverty. Over 70 per
cent were estimated to be poor in Madagascar and Zambia. And 66 per cent of
Nigerians were estimated to be poor in 1996.
•   There is no uniform trend. While consumption poverty incidence declined substantially
in several countries (Ethiopia, Ghana, Mauritania and Uganda), it rose sharply in
Nigeria and Zimbabwe. Poverty has fluctuated in Zambia and Madagascar, increasing
marginally in the former and remaining more or less unchanged in the latter.
•   Where the incidence of poverty has declined, the data suggest that the poorest sections
of the population have also benefited. This is suggested by the significant downward
trend in P2. In several cases the percentage fall in the P2 measure was greater than that in
P0.
Table 3: Consumption poverty in eight African countries during the 1990s
Poverty headcount (P0) Severity index (P2)
Year 1 Year 2 % change Year 1 Year 2 % change
Ethiopia
1994-97 41 35 -14 8 6 -27
Ghana
1992-98 51 39 -24 9 7 -22
Madagascar
1993-97 70 73 5 17 19 12
1997-99 73 71 -3 19 19 0
Mauritania
1987-95 58 35 -40 17 6 -65
Nigeria
1985-92 46 43 -7 8 9 13
1992-96 43 66 53 9 17 89
Uganda
1992-97 56 44 -21 10 6 -40
1997-2000 44 35 -20 6 5 -16
Zambia
1991-96 70 80 14 30 31 1
1996-98 80 76 -5 31 26 -16
Zimbabwe
1991-96 26 35 35 4 5 25
Source: World Bank data and country studies under Dynamics of Poverty study (see footnote 3 and
references).
2.3 Poverty, inequality and economic growth
In some cases these changes in poverty occurred in a context of economic decline (Nigeria
and Zimbabwe, and Madagascar and Zambia during the earlier periods). In others they
accompanied overall economic progress (Ethiopia, Ghana, Mauritania and Uganda). To
shed more light on the relation between poverty, inequality and growth, Table 4  presents a8

















1994-97 24.8 -13.8 -0.56 1.09 0.53
Ghana
1992-98 24.9 -23.6 -0.95 -0.99 0.04
Madagascar
1993–97 -17.5 4.7 -0.27 -0.77 0.50
1997–99 0.6 -2.7 -4.50 -0.78 -3.72
1993-99 -17 1.9 -0.11 -0.73 0.62
Mauritania
1987-95 49.5 -40.4 -0.82 -0.75 -0.07
Nigeria
1992-96 -41.1 53.6 -1.30 -1.32 0.02
Uganda
1992-97 17.1 -20.7 -1.21 -1.06 -0.15
Zambia
1991-96 -25.7 14.9 -0.58 -0.58 0.00
1996-98 13.2 -4.9 -0.37 -0.44 0.07
Zimbabwe
1991-96 -28.8 35.3 -1.23 -2.22 0.99
Note: 1Purposively sampled villages and urban centers; not nationally representative. *Decompositions based
on Kakwani and Pernia (2000). Note that this method is an exact decomposition with no residual or interactive
term.
Source: World Bank data and country studies under Dynamics of Poverty study (see footnote 3 and
references).
decomposition of poverty incidence into two components: changes explained by changes
in mean consumption (keeping the distribution of consumption unchanged); and changes
arising from changing consumption distribution (with mean consumption kept constant).
The poverty measure decomposed in the table is the elasticity of headcount poverty with
respect to changes in mean household expenditure.8
                                                
8 This is defined as the proportionate change in headcount poverty divided by the proportionate change in
mean per capita household expenditure. For details of the method used see Kakwani and Pernia (2000).9
In most countries, changes in poverty incidence are due predominantly to changes in mean
expenditure (Table 4). But the results of this exercise also serve as a caution against over-
generalizing for Africa. Uganda’s growth experience (in which reduction in inequality
bolstered the effects of rising mean consumption) contrasts with that of Ethiopia, where
inequality increased, and dampened the poverty reducing impact of growth.  Where there
has been recession, mean and redistribution effects typically have opposite signs, and the
redistribution effect substantially mitigates the poverty increasing impact of lower mean
incomes (in Madagascar, Nigeria and Zimbabwe). Better-off groups clearly bear a heavier
burden of income losses during periods of economic decline in Africa.9 To assess further
the extent to which these episodes of growth and recession are ‘pro-poor’ we follow




where η  is the observed elasticity of headcount poverty with respect to changes in mean
expenditure, and η g is the elasticity of headcount poverty assuming the distribution of
income did not change during the period. φ  can be defined as an index of ‘pro-poor
growth’. Growth can be considered pro-poor if φ  > 1.10 Table 5 compares estimates of φ
for these eight African countries with recent experience in Asia. On the basis of this
sample of countries, growth and recession episodes in Africa have tended to be pro-poor,11
and indeed more so than the Asian experience.
Table 5: Pro-poor growth indices (φ ) in selected African and Asian countries
Growth episodes:
Ethiopia 1994-97 0.51 Thailand, 1992-96 0.61
Ghana, 1992-98 0.96 Lao PDR, 1993-98 0.21




Madagascar, 1993-97 2.85 Thailand, 1996-98 0.73
Nigeria, 1992-96 1.02 Korea, 1997-98 0.84
Zambia 1991-96 0.97
Zimbabwe, 1991-96 1.81
Note: For details of method see text. Asian country estimates are simple means across years within the
subperiods shown.
Sources: Table 4; Kakwani and Pernia (2000).
                                                
9 The tendency for income inequality to narrow as higher income groups bear the brunt of economic
recession was also noted by Grootaert (1996) in analyzing poverty changes in Côte d’Ivoire in the 1980s.
Though this does not seem to have occurred in Zambia during 1991-6.
10 When mean household expenditures are declining, φ = η g /η , so that a recession would also be considered
pro-poor if φ  > 1.
11 This should of course not be taken to mean that the poor did not suffer during recessions, but rather that
the rich suffered relatively quite a bit more.10
Taking all eleven spells of poverty change in our sample of African countries reported in
Table 4, we obtain a growth elasticity of poverty incidence of just -0.89 (Figure 1).12
While growth is ‘pro-poor’, its quantitative impact on the headcount is limited in this
sample. This follows from the fact that inequality did not change significantly, and it
reflects the depth of poverty—large numbers are subsisting well below the poverty line
(and poverty lines are set well above modal consumption). The growth elasticity of the
severity index (P2), at -1.28 (with a standard error of 0.21) is higher, indicating that growth
has improved the economic well-being of the poorest, though not enough to take many of
them out of poverty.
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As discussed above, countries with lower initial inequality typically grow more rapidly in
subsequent years, and experience greater poverty impact from that growth. The experience
of this (albeit small) sample of African countries seems consistent with this view
(Figure 1). The countries that had lower levels of initial inequality (as evidenced by the
Gini ratios), were more likely to experience declines in poverty in subsequent years.
spearman (correlation is 0.72 and statistically significant at 5 per cent level). Nonetheless,
that said, there is also sufficient variation around this empirical regularity and the sample
size is sufficiently small to counsel caution.
                                                
12 This is simply the slope coefficient in the regression of the proportionate change in headcount poverty on
the proportionate change in the survey mean. The standard error on the slope coefficient is 0.11. When
plotting the regression line, it runs almost through the origin, a reflection of the fact that income inequality
has been stable over this period. The historical elasticities we observe for this sample of African countries are
significantly lower than that estimated by Ravallion (2001) to be typical of low-income countries (-2.5).
Given the different poverty lines used (he uses the much lower benchmark of PPP$1/day) and the different
method of computation, his estimates are not comparable with ours.11
3 Growth and systematic changes in income distribution
The evidence from the African experience covered in this study indicates that growth and
recession have been pro-poor. Yet, further decomposition of national inequality and
poverty measures—by socioeconomic group and geographical location—indicates that the
aggregate statistics often mask a wide variety of experiences. Some groups and regions
gained disproportionately from the new opportunities following economic reforms and
growth, while others lost out or even became impoverished. Similarly, overall Gini
coefficients often appear stable over time despite substantial churning within and across
geographical regions. These divergent experiences suggest that in addition to reforms in
economic policy, other factors such as location and infrastructure, households’ private
endowments, and the occurrence of shocks further condition if households can escape
poverty in the wake of overall economic growth.
To disentangle the effects of these disparate events and factors on the different sections of
African society, studies have often relied on economy-wide modeling techniques
(Bourguignon and Morrison 1992; Sahn et al. 1997). These techniques can generate
counterfactuals and provide important insights into the respective impacts of policies and
other shocks. On the other hand, the models typically impose a strong structure which
sometimes leads to questions about their realism. In addition, they are most often
calibrated at one point in time. As a result, they cannot always confidently track changes
over time—the economic history, which usually involves policy-induced structural
changes in the economy. This study places emphasis instead on the microeconometric
evidence emerging from the much improved and richer household survey data. We
highlight in particular two poverty dynamics panel studies—Dercon (2002) on Ethiopia,
and Deininger and Okidi (2001) on Uganda. Focusing on the factors they identify as key
for economic growth and poverty reduction, we then assess the evidence from the other
case studies which use either repeated cross sectional regressions (Zimbabwe, Madagascar,
Ghana) or simply an extensively documented narrative linking the macro-events to the
observed evolutions in household welfare (Zambia and Mauritania).
The Ethiopia and Uganda studies are particularly informative. First, both involve the use of
panel data, and their methodologies and results are similar. Second, both countries
experienced far-reaching reforms in economic policy, inducing changes in market
institutions, relative prices and producer behaviour. The rural sector in Ethiopia had
previously been largely ignored and heavily taxed. In the early 1990s agricultural reforms
were initiated including the abolition of food delivery quota for farmers, and a relaxation
(and later abolition) of restrictions on private grain trades. These measures substantially
reduced the food marketing margins between surplus and deficit regions. The Birr was
devalued by 142 per cent and the foreign exchange markets were liberalized. This
positively affected the farmgate prices of tradeables, such as coffee and chat, even though
the effect was somewhat muted due to the existence of parallel markets. Producer prices
for coffee also evolved favourably during the period because of increasing world prices.12
In Uganda, government policy changed from the late 1980s on, dismantling the biases
against rural producers. Coffee marketing and exports were liberalized, and direct export
taxation was abandoned. Similar measures were taken in the cotton sector. The foreign
exchange market was liberalized, leading to real exchange rate depreciation. The weighted
mean real producer price of export crops in Uganda (77 per cent of which are coffee)
increased by 78 per cent between 1989-91 and 1995-97. Decomposition of this increase
underscores the importance of the liberalization of the export crop markets for the cash
crop producers. Changes in the nominal protection coefficient (producer price/border
price), changes in the real exchange rate, and changes in the real world price contributed
respectively 58, 9 and 11 per cent (Townsend 1999). Agricultural output recovered,
averaging between 4 to 4.5 per cent per annum in real terms over the past decade, and this
has played an important role in reducing poverty (Appleton et al. 1999).
Table 6: Decomposition of consumption growth per adult and poverty gap ratio
(percentage points) in Ethiopia
Actual Counterfactual: Counterfactual:
No reform and peace No risk
Growth Poverty Growth Poverty Growth Poverty
Real crop price change 15 -18 15 -16
Change in returns to road
access/location 19 -23 19 -21
Private endowments
Increase in land 7 -10 1 -2 7 -8
Change in returns to land 3 0 3 -1
Increases in adult labour 3 -4 3 -4 3 -4
Changes in returns to educated
adults
00 00
Change in adult equivalent units -5 7 -5 7 -5 7
Shocks
Relative rainfall shock -8 13 -8 14
Illness shocks -4 5 -4 5
Residual 0 0 0 3 0 0
Percentage growth and percentage
point poverty change (sum of above) 32 -29 -13 23 42 -44
Source: Dercon (2002).
Both Dercon (2002) and Deininger and Okidi (2001) use household panel data to assess
how changes in economic policies and their effects on producer prices, influenced
household welfare and rural poverty. Dercon (2002) uses panel data from six rural
communities13 in Ethiopia covering the period 1989-95. The change in household real
consumption per adult is explained through a reduced form regression model with an
Oaxaca-Blinder type decomposition. In this approach changes in consumption and poverty
                                                
13 Because the study is not nationally representative, the results cannot be generalized to Ethiopia as a
whole. Nonetheless, the methodology adopted as well as the empirical findings themselves provide important
insights in the linkages between economic policy, growth and poverty reduction.13
can be explained by changes in endowments over time and changes in returns to
endowments. The main regressors were changes in real crop producer prices (which
Dercon shows to be closely related to the macroeconomic and agricultural reforms
implemented during this period), location (proxied by distance to an urban center), access
to roads, private endowments (land, labour and education), and two shock variables,
rainfall and ill-health. His results are summarized in Table 6.
Household consumption increased on average by 32 per cent between 1989 and 1995, and
poverty—here defined as the poverty gap in logs—decreased by 29 percentage points. The
growth in rural household incomes was largely fueled by changes in relative food-crop
prices,14 and increased returns to location and access to road infrastructure. Dercon’s
simulations show that consumption would have declined by 13 per cent and poverty would
have increased by 23 per cent had there been no peace and no economic and agricultural
reforms.15 Interestingly, all poor households (even those who fell into poverty) benefited
from the relative price changes that occurred. These findings suggest that the reforms and
increased political stability substantially improved well-being of the poor, directly through
a favourable change in relative prices, and for those well connected to markets, indirectly
through an increase in the returns to market connectedness as determined by road
infrastructure and distance to urban centers.
In addition to public endowments, such as road infrastructure and location, private
endowments are also found to be important for consumption growth and poverty
reduction.16 Increases in land holdings (through redistribution) or improvement in the
quality of the land owned, and increases in adult labour reduced poverty by 14 percentage
points. Returns to land also increased,17 but because the poor typically possess little (and
often less fertile) land, they profited much less than the average household from the
increased returns to land. Finally, the occurrence of shocks (especially rainfall, but also
illness shocks) had a large negative effect, both on the growth process and poverty
outcomes. If households had had access to full insurance protection from rainfall and
health shocks, poverty would have declined by 42 percentage points compared with 29
percentage points in its absence. Dercon shows that the reason why households fell into
poverty during this period was mainly the combined effects of the rainfall and illness
                                                
14 Coffee prices also improved, yet coffee was grown in only one of the six sample villages, and the coffee
harvest had failed that year in that particular village due to pest attack and drought. The effect of changing
export crop prices cannot be evaluated from this sample, but its importance has been assessed explicitly in
the Uganda case study described below.
15 Dercon (1995) shows that the cereal marketing margins mainly improved because of the liberalization of
the grain markets and only on some routes did the end of the war have a significant effect.
16 Adult education levels are extremely low, less than 1 year per adult, and they are assumed not to have
changed. The effect of education as such, as opposed to changes in returns to education, has thus not been
evaluated in this study.
17 As the direct effect of changing producer prices has been controlled for, changes in returns to land result
from other factors such as shifts in the underlying production technology potentially induced by the reforms.14
shocks. In sum, households that escaped poverty during the period not only benefited from
better producer prices, they also enjoyed a more favourable location, and were endowed
with good access to infrastructure and better land. Those who remained poor or who fell
into poverty, despite their participation in the gains from the agricultural reforms, did so in
part because they were badly placed in terms of location and land. They also suffered most
from poor rainfall and from ill-health.
Deininger and Okidi (2001) analyze changes in consumption and income observed for a
panel of about 1,200 Ugandan households during the period 1992-2000. They regress
household level changes in consumption and income against variables representing the
change in relative producer prices of coffee, access to infrastructure, initial endowments of
physical and human capital, the initial health status of households, and their social capital.
They found these variables to be significant in explaining growth in Ugandan household
incomes during the 1990s. As in Ethiopia, the effect of changes in relative prices (in this
case an increase in farmgate coffee prices largely brought about by market liberalization,
but also by the devaluation and favourable world prices) on consumption growth was
substantial.
Initial private endowments of education and other assets (mainly land) were also crucial
for consumption growth. For example, if households had had 6 years of completed
schooling on average (instead of the observed 3 years)—equivalent to completing primary
schooling—growth in consumption would have been 2 percentage points higher. A
difference of one standard deviation in terms of initial asset value (about half of which is
accounted for by land) put households on a 2 percentage point higher consumption growth
path. Households which in 1992 were afflicted by health problems—reportedly related to
malaria in over 80 per cent of cases—experienced consumption growth which was (other
things constant) 1.8 percentage points lower than those not experiencing such problems.
Households with access to electricity enjoyed consumption growth that was 6 percentage
points higher than other households.
The above results offer insight into what determined the growth in income and
consumption among Ugandan households. How did such growth affect poverty?  To
address this, Deininger and Okidi estimate a multinomial logit model of changes in poverty
status (households are classified as either not changing their status, falling into poverty or
escaping from poverty). They find that the relative coffee price changes had a powerful
poverty-reducing impact, indicating that their effect was broad-based and that price
changes in tradable commodities directly benefited poor producers (and not only indirectly
through the labour market.) Moreover, households with higher education, more initial
assets (land), better health, and better access to infrastructure (electricity) and location
(distance to municipality) were far less likely than others to fall into poverty, and more
likely to escape from it. The results from these microeconometric analyses of panel data
suggest that following factors are influential in determining the relationship between
economic growth and poverty reduction:15
•   First, many poor rural households stand to benefit directly from reform—in this case
liberalization measures and the gains can be substantial. In so far as liberalization
measures increase producer prices, rural producers gain, and to the extent that food
marketing margins tend to decline, rural consumers will benefit as well. Nonetheless,
some gain more than others, depending on the product- and consumption-mix of the
household.
•   Second, a household’s remoteness appears key in conditioning the extent to which it
will benefit from liberalization measures. Specifically, whether the household had
access to infrastructure and urban markets was an immensely important factor in
governing the growth in household income. It explains about half of household
consumption growth and poverty reduction in Ethiopia during 1989-95, and it was also
quantitatively important for growth in Ugandan household income. Connectedness to
markets as captured by access to infrastructure (especially roads, but also electricity)
and distance to urban centers is likely to be a major factor in determining how growth in
any country transmits its benefits to the population.
•   Third, the potential for economic growth and poverty reduction further depends on a
household’s private endowments. Households with larger private endowments—be it
more and better qualified labour or land—not only tend to be less poor, they are also
better placed to profit from new opportunities generated by liberalization and
institutional change.
•   Finally, it is vital to separate out the effect of shocks when assessing the role of policy
changes. Dercon highlights rainfall and health shocks, both of which are certain to be
relevant to poor households in most African countries. The importance of health shocks
is also underscored by Deininger and Okidi for the Ugandan case. Export commodity
price fluctuations, though not explicitly treated in these studies, form another important
risk factor.
We now examine the evidence on distribution and poverty changes in other countries
covered in this review, looking for echoes of the findings from the panel data of Ethiopia
and Uganda, and focusing on three issues: reforms, remoteness and risks.18
3.1 Reform
The changes in relative prices through exchange rate devaluations, the opening of domestic
markets, and changes in the structure of production are certain to lead to shifts in income
distribution, with producers of tradable goods (mostly exportables) benefiting directly from
the economic policy reforms. The Ugandan and Ethiopian studies show that these effects
were evident during the 1990s, and that they directly benefited poor households. The
experience of Ghana in West Africa echoes these East African findings. Ghana
                                                
18 The importance of private endowments (human and physical capital assets and land) is also underscored
by the two panel studies. Given the acceptance of these in the literature, we focus here on the three other
themes.16
experienced sharp poverty reductions among cash (export) crop producers during the
1990s, a result of more favourable world cocoa prices and an increase in cocoa production.
Table 7 compares trends in poverty among crop producers in rural Uganda and Ghana.
Table 7: Poverty incidence by rural activity, Ghana and Uganda in the 1990s
Uganda Ghana
Population




share (1998) 1992 1998
%
reduction
Food crop 45.9 63.3 45.7 -27.8 43.9 68.1 59.4 -12.8
Cash crop 21.3 62.7 29.7 -52.6 6.3 64.0 38.7 -39.5
Source: Appleton (2001); Coulombe and McKay (2001).
In both countries about two-fifths of the population are food producing farmers, of whom
about two-thirds were poor in the early 1990s. And in both countries, poverty fell among
food producers, but the decline was not as great as that experienced by export crop
producers. Most of the rural poor appear to have benefited from growth, but those
producing export crops have benefited most. A much larger share of the population in
Uganda grows cash crops (21 per cent) than in Ghana (6 per cent) which may explain the
larger drop in poverty amongst food-crop producers in Uganda due to externality effects.
Reviewing the existing evidence on the experience with agricultural reforms in sub-
Saharan Africa, Kherallah et al. (2002) arrive at a similar conclusion—export-crop
producers seem to have benefited more than food-crop producers. What needs to be better
understood is the transmission mechanism that led to economic gains of households not
producing for export.
Potential pathways include rural labour markets, with higher export crop prices stimulating
export crop production leading to increased demand for agricultural wage labour and
ultimately higher agricultural real wages. Abdulai and Delgado (2000) find that in Ghana a
one per cent change in the domestic terms of trade between agriculture and non-agriculture
leads to a 0.83 per cent change in the real agricultural wage rate in the long run,
underscoring the importance of labour markets in transmitting the effects of economic
reforms. Increased liquidity in rural economies from agricultural exports can also have
important spin-off effects, through an expansion of both investment in export and food-
crop production, and increased consumption of goods and services produced with
previously underutilized local labour, land or capital. As a rule of thumb Delgado et al.
(1998) posit that any policy-enhancing producer income from agricultural exports
increases local rural income by twice the amount of the increased exports.
To understand the different evolution in poverty among food- and cash-crop producers, it
is important to keep in mind that the former group tends to be much more heterogeneous
than the latter. In export-crop growing regions, the effects of favourable export crop prices
were transmitted to the food-crop growing households—either through the labour market17
or the input and product markets, or both. Transmission of such benefits to areas unsuitable
for export crop production, especially when they are also remote, is much harder. For
example, in Ghana food producers in more remote and less integrated regions (in the north)
did not experience a similar reduction in their poverty as food growers in cash-crop (and
better integrated) areas (Coulombe and McKay 2001). Similarly, food-crop producers in
northern Uganda, which is also less accessible, appear not to have benefited from recent
growth (Appleton 2001).
3.2 Remoteness
The panel analysis of Ethiopian and Ugandan households provides strong empirical
evidence that location and geography are important in determining how growth influences
income distribution. These findings are supported by the experiences in the other case
study countries. In some, the decline in poverty is observed in both the rural and urban
areas (Uganda, Mauritania, Ghana; see Table 8). In others, the change is confined mainly
to urban areas (Zambia between 1991-96). Striking differences in poverty changes are also
observed across the administrative regions (Table 9). For example, while poverty incidence
in Toliara (Madagascar) declined by just over 10 per cent during the 1990s, it increased by
more than 40 per cent in Mahajanga (from 53 to 76 percentage points). In Uganda, the
Central Province saw its poverty head count halve between 1992 and 2000, though it
declined by only 9 per cent in the Northern Province. Poverty dropped by 80 per cent in
Greater Accra (Ghana), while it rose by one third in the Upper East, and the regional
discrepancies in the evolution of poverty observed in Zambia were of similar magnitude.19


















  1992-98 67 64 49 -15 28 19 -9
Madagascar
  1993-99 81 74.5 76.7 2.2 50.1 52.1 2
Mauritania
  1987-95 56 68 48 -20 45 17 -28
Nigeria
  1992-96 62 46 69 23 37 58 21
Uganda
  1992-97 88 59 48 -11 28 16 -12
Zambia
  1991-96 62 88 90 2 47 62 15
  1996-98 62 90 86 -4 62 59 -3
Zimbabwe
 1991-96 63 36 48 12 3 8 5
Sources: Country studies under the Poverty Dynamics study (see footnote 3 and references).
                                                
19 A similar pattern emerges when looking at average consumption growth across regions, as opposed to
poverty change.18
Clearly, geography matters in conditioning growth and poverty reduction, and the reasons
for this can be manifold (Ravallion 2002). The marginal cost of adopting new
technologies, household access to input and output markets, agro-ecological characteristics
of the environment, and the availability of public infrastructure can differ considerably
across regions.
Table 9: Regional poverty change
1 in four African countries during the 1990s
Country Selected regions Poverty headcount (P0)
Year 1 (%) Year 2 (%) % change
Ghana (1992-98) Greater Accra 26 5 -80
Upper East 67 88 32
country total 51 39 -24
Madagascar (1993-99) Toliara 81 72 -12
Mahajanga 53 76 43
country total 70 71 2
Uganda (1992-2000) Central 46 20 -55
North 72 66 -9
country total 56 35 -37
Zambia (1991-98) Northwestern 78 62 -21
Lusaka 31 60 94
country total 69 76 10
Note: 1The regions with the largest positive and the largest negative change are reported for each country.
Sources: Country studies under the Poverty Dynamics study (see footnote 3 and references).
























































Source: Coulombe and McKay (2001).19
The evidence from the Ethiopian and Ugandan panel studies has especially pointed to the
importance of market connectedness, as proxied by distance to urban centers and road
infrastructure, and the role of public infrastructure (electricity). These themes also appear
important in understanding the experiences from Ghana, Madagascar and Zambia. Poverty
in Accra fell sharply, but not in other urban areas (Figure 2). In the Savannah zone poverty
even increased in the urban areas, while it fell only marginally in the rural Savannah.
Moreover, even after controlling for a host of household characteristics, community
infrastructure variables and the agro-ecological environment (Coulombe and McKay 2001)
living standards in the northern region appear much lower. Important clues as to why
Ghanaians in the north did not benefit from growth are found in recent papers by Badiane
and Shively (1998) and Abdulai (2000), which conclude that markets (more specifically
the maize market) in the remoter northern region are not very well integrated with the
economy at large. This lack of integration most likely impeded the transmission of the
benefits of growth to the region. The multivariate regression analysis by Coulombe and
McKay (2001) further indicates that communities with access to electricity tend to be
better off.
Table 10: Rural poverty incidence by ‘remoteness’ quintile, Madagascar and Zambia (per
cent)
Madagascar (P0 ) Zambia (P0 )
1997 1999 1991 1998
1 most remote 79 84 86 75
2 8 27 88 17 6
3 7 67 68 37 3
4 7 27 28 27 4
5 least remote 72 72 69 69
Sources: Paternostro, Razafindravonona and Stifel (2001); and authors’ computations.
‘Remoteness’ is also important in understanding geographical differences in poverty
outcomes in Madagascar. Paternostro et al. (2001) disaggregate poverty according to an
index of remoteness, the latter being a weighted sum of indicators reflecting access to
roads, bus stop, agricultural extension services, modern fertilizers, and distance to schools
and health facilities (the weights were derived from factor analysis). Their findings
(Table 10) indicate an association between the degree of remoteness and the likelihood of
being in poverty. They also show that while overall rural poverty remained largely
unchanged during 1997 and 1999, households assessed to be the most remote, experienced
increased poverty—in contrast to the least remote quintile where poverty indicators
actually improved. In a similar fashion a remoteness index was constructed for Zambia
based on households’ distance to the food market, the post office and a public phone,
public transport (potential indicators of market connectedness), primary and secondary
school and distance to the hospital (indicators of access to public services). Again
households in the most remote areas appear substantially poorer than those in the least
remote areas. These findings are replicated when households are only classified according
to an index of market connectedness or an index of access to public services, suggesting20
that geography affects poverty both through market connectedness and the availability of
public services.
While the evidence presented shows that location is crucial in conditioning growth and
poverty reduction linkages, a better understanding of the transmission channels is called
for. Does the Peruvian experience (Escobal and Torero 2003) that private and public assets
are more important in explaining regional income variations than agro-ecological
characteristics also hold in the African context? Do spatial externalities affect growth and
poverty reduction as suggested by the findings from rural China (Ravallion 2002)? The
policy ramifications of such insights are substantial, as they shed light on the longstanding
debate about the economic desirability of public investment in resource poor areas vis-a-
vis the promotion of outmigration or resettlement.
3.3 Risk
Poverty estimates provide a snapshot of the standard of living at a certain point in time
and reflect both policy reforms as well as temporary external shocks such as droughts.
When evaluating the evolution of poverty it is thus important to control for the effect of
external shocks on comparative poverty figures. Controlling for all other factors, the
Ethiopian panel analysis estimated that household income growth was reduced by about
a fifth because of rainfall shortage (Dercon 2002). The role of rainfall variations in
influencing household income growth was also an important feature of the Zimbabwean
and Madagascar experience.
Figure 3: Zimbabwe, shift in welfare distribution, 1990-95
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Source: Alwang et al. (2002).21
Figure 4: Zimbabwe, simulated effects of rainfall and household characteristics on
changes in the welfare distribution, 1990–95
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That poverty increased sharply in Zimbabwe during the 1990s is without question (Alwang
et al. 2002). The decline in economic well-being (and increase in poverty) is evident from
the leftward shift in the distribution of real household consumption (Figure 3). The change
occurred mainly in the vicinity of the poverty line (Z$30 per month)—with a sharp
increase in the numbers of people consuming just below, and a parallel decline in the
numbers just above the poverty line. What is less clear is whether poverty increased
because of the droughts that afflicted the country in 1991/92 and again in 1994/95, or
because of the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (launched in 1991) which was
being implemented at the same time. Alwang et al. (2002) apply non-parametric methods
to simulate what the 1995 distribution would have been if the 1990 rainfall patterns had
applied that year. This exercise confirms that the drought led to an increase in poverty
during the early 1990s, but it also indicates that the drought alone cannot explain the
deterioration in economic well-being (Figure 4, Panel A). As discussed before, actual
changes in household location, assets and individual characteristics (notably the levels of
educational attainment) would actually, other things constant, have raised consumption
levels and reduced poverty (Figure 4, Panel B). Without such changes incomes would have
deteriorated even more than they did. Evidence from Madagascar further underscores the
importance of weather shocks in comparing poverty over time. Simulations indicate that 75
per cent of the predicted change in household economic well-being and poverty incidence
can be traced back to the relative change in drought occurrence between 1993 and 1999.
The insurance capacity of households against covariate shocks in many parts of Africa is
clearly extremely limited.
Panel A
Effects of rainfall (rural distribution only)
Panel B
Effects individual and household characteristics
∆   Observed difference between 1990 and 1995
o  Difference between actual 1995 distribution and the 1995 distribution adjusted to 1990 conditions22
4 Concluding remarks
While it is true that overall income distributions (evidenced by the Gini ratio) have not
changed during African episodes of growth, and that such growth (or recession) can be
characterized as pro-poor in this aggregate sense, beneath these numbers exists a variety of
experience. Neglect of this reality by policymakers—and sometimes also by academics—
has often impeded a constructive and fruitful dialogue with ‘civil society’ about
appropriate poverty reducing policies (Kanbur 2001). Our review of the microeconomic
evidence shows that there have been systematic changes in income distributions and
poverty in the countries covered. Of the main contours of these distribution changes, we
have highlighted three key policy messages: the importance of economic reform for
poverty reduction; the role of location and remoteness in conditioning how the benefits of
growth are distributed; and the need to account for shocks in understanding distributional
outcomes and poverty changes over time. The analysis of household panel data by Dercon
(2002) for Ethiopia and Deininger and Okidi (2001) for Uganda provides the most
systematic and empirically convincing cases that policy-induced changes in relative prices
can have poverty-reducing effects. Micro-evidence from Ghana provides some
corroboration from West Africa.
The second message is the need for a geographical perspective on poverty. The recent
microeconomic evidence on poverty dynamics has shown that some regions, by virtue of
their sheer remoteness, have been left behind somewhat as growth has picked up.
Households with limited access to markets and public services have not benefited from
growth during the 1990s. The provision of public goods (notably infrastructure services—
from the Ethiopian case, especially roads and from the Ugandan case, electricity) is crucial
to help poor households benefit from the opportunities generated by economic policy
reforms and growth. Third, the microeconomic evidence underscores the importance of
social protection in a poverty reduction strategy. The impact of rainfall variations and ill
health are the two risk factors featured. Dercon (2002) estimates that poverty reduction in
the sample of Ethiopian rural communities would have been 18 percentage points greater
had households been protected from the effects of ill-health and rainfall shortages. The
importance of weather shocks for poverty changes was also underscored by the findings
from Zimbabwe and Madagascar. Deininger and Okidi (2001) find that ill-health amongst
Ugandans back in 1992 noticeably increased the probability of being in poverty eight years
later. In light of households’ greater exposure to disease, and to the vagaries of weather
(and world commodity prices following liberalization), policies to help the poor manage
their risks have become even more important nowadays.23
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